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Abstract: 
It is commonly held that unexcused impermissible acts are necessarily blameworthy, not 
praiseworthy. I begin by arguing that unexcused impermissible acts can be pro tanto 
praiseworthy, even if they are overall blameworthy. I proceed to argue that unexcused 
impermissible acts can not only be overall praiseworthy, but more so than permissible 
alternatives. I develop and explore a general framework illuminating how praiseworthiness can 
come apart from deontic status in such a radical way. The framework consists of a distinction 
between the act-properties of requiring reason and justification, and views about how these 
properties relate to praiseworthiness and blameworthiness respectively. The conceptual 
possibilities highlighted by this framework are not mere conceptual possibilities. I argue, for 
example, that there are cases in which it is impermissible to at great cost to yourself rescue a 
lesser number of strangers rather than a greater number, yet overall praiseworthy, and more so 
than permissibly rescuing no one.  
 
                                                          
1 For very helpful written comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Brian Berkey, Joseph Bowen, Matthew 
Clark, Roger Crisp, Johann Frick, Peter Graham, Joe Horton, Shelly Kagan, Frances Kamm, Per Milam, Kian 
Mintz-Woo, Daniel Muñoz, Julia Nefsky, Douglas Portmore, Justin Snedegar, Travis Timmerman, Erik Zhang, 
and especially the editors and two referees at Ethics. Many thanks also to audiences at the Princeton DeCamp 
Seminar, the Princeton Workshop in Normative Philosophy, the Rutgers Value Theory Reading Group, and the 
Yale Moral Philosophy Working Group. 
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Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy 
 
Suppose you are morally required to adopt a vegan diet, but you adopt a lacto-vegetarian diet 
instead. Although what you do is impermissible, blaming you for not going all the way to 
veganism could be counterproductive. Perhaps the effects of blaming you are even bad enough 
that we ought not to do so. But the effects of blaming you do not settle whether you are 
blameworthy, in the sense of it being appropriate to have a negative reactive attitude toward 
you for your conduct, or in the sense of your being deserving of discredit for your conduct.2 To 
be praiseworthy or blameworthy is to be worthy of praise or blame, in some such sense, for 
one’s conduct.3 
                                                          
2 I am thus here setting aside consequentialist accounts of blameworthiness. See, for instance: Richard Arneson, 
“The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility and Desert,” in Desert and Justice, edited by Serena Olsaretti 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 233–58. It also seems that you can be worthy of blame even when we 
lack the standing to blame you. On the latter, see, for instance: R. Jay Wallace, “Hypocrisy, Moral Address and 
the Equal Standing of Persons,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (2010): 307–341; Macalester Bell, “The 
Standing to Blame: A Critique,” in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, edited by Justin Coates and Neal Tognazzini 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 263–281. 
3 For a sample of relevant literature, see: Michael Zimmerman, An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1988); Holly Smith, “Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit,” Ethics 101 (1991): 
279–303; R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); 
Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); 
Julia Markovits, “Acting for the Right Reasons,” Philosophical Review 119 (2010): 201–42; Michelle Mason, 
“Blame: Taking It Seriously,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2011): 473–81; Amy Massoud, 
“Moral Worth and Supererogation,” Ethics 126 (2016): 690–710; Dana Nelkin, “Difficulty and Degrees of Moral 
Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness,” Noûs 50 (2016): 356–78; David Shoemaker, “Response-Dependent 
Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame,” Philosophical Review 126 (2017): 481–527; 
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It is commonly held that unexcused impermissible acts are necessarily blameworthy, 
not praiseworthy.4 On some views, what it means for an act to be impermissible is that it is 
blameworthy, absent excusing conditions. On other views, all unexcused impermissible acts 
are blameworthy, even if what it means for an act to be impermissible is not that it is 
blameworthy, but, for example, that it mustn’t be done.5  
In this paper, I defend the following claim: 
 
Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy: There are situations in which it is overall 
praiseworthy to do an act A, and more so than it is to do a permissible and entirely 
blameless alternative B, even though A is impermissible, and all relevant responsibility 
conditions are met (so that A is unexcused).  
 
It may, for example, be impermissible to at great cost to yourself rescue one stranger rather 
than two, yet overall praiseworthy, and more so than permissibly rescuing none. No one to my 
knowledge has defended Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy.6 Not only is this claim interesting 
                                                          
Elinor Mason, Ways to be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2019); Pamela Hieronymi, Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2020). 
4 For example, see: Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), chapter 3; John 
Skorupski, The Domain of Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), part III; Stephen Darwall, Morality, 
Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 21; Brian 
McElwee, “Demandingness Objections in Ethics,” Philosophical Quarterly 67 (2017): 84–105. 
5 See Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chapter 7. 
6 The impermissible yet praiseworthy is in some sense the mirror image of the suberogatory, that is, the permissible 
yet blameworthy. See Julia Driver, “The Suberogatory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1992): 286–295. 
In “Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes,” Ethics 126 (2016): 366–393, Elizabeth Harman recognizes moral 
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and surprising, but it is also of potentially great dialectical significance. If it is correct, then we 
cannot conclude that an act is permissible from the fact that it is praiseworthy, or from the fact 
that it is more praiseworthy than a permissible alternative.7 
 In section I, I present cases in which praiseworthiness appears to attach to 
impermissible acts. These impermissible acts seem pro tanto praiseworthy, and some might 
even be overall praiseworthy. However, since these impermissible acts are not more 
praiseworthy overall than permissible alternatives, the cases presented in section I are not of 
the form picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy. In section II, I offer a general 
framework illuminating how praiseworthiness can come apart from deontic status in this more 
radical way. The framework showing this conceptual possibility consists of a distinction 
between the act-properties of requiring reason and justification, and views about how these 
properties relate to praiseworthiness and blameworthiness respectively. In section III, I move 
beyond mere conceptual possibility. I argue there plausibly are cases of the form picked out by 
Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy, in which you can at great cost to yourself rescue more or 
fewer people. The intended purpose of this section is to provide, by way of illustration, a more 
                                                          
mistakes that are praiseworthy, but, crucially, these are morally permissible moral mistakes. Markovits 2010 and 
Massoud 2016 leave it an open possibility that some impermissible acts are to some extent praiseworthy. 
7 Insofar as a supererogatory act is a non-required act that is praiseworthy, or more praiseworthy than a merely 
permissible alternative, I can be read as arguing that some supererogatory acts are impermissible (though it is not 
my aim here to defend a view of the supererogatory per se). For relevant discussion, see: Joseph Raz, “Permissions 
and Supererogation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975): 161–168, 164; David Heyd, Supererogation: 
Its Status in Ethical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Ulla Wessels, “Beyond the Call of 
Duty: The Structure of a Moral Region,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 87–104; Alfred 
Archer, “Are Acts of Supererogation Always Praiseworthy?” Theoria 82 (2016): 238–55; Claire Benn, 
“Supererogation, Optionality, and Cost,” Philosophical Studies 175 (2018): 2399–2417; Daniel Muñoz, “Three 
Paradoxes of Supererogation,” Noûs (2020) https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12326. 
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robust defense of the central claim that there are some cases of this general form (even if none 
of the particular ones I discuss are). In section IV, I suggest—as a supplement to the framework 
presented in section II—that there may be limits on when impermissible acts can be overall 
praiseworthy. The holding of such limits will constrain the form that cases picked out by 
Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy can take. In section V, I conclude with a brief discussion of 
some potential practical implications.  
It is worth bearing in mind that my focus in this paper is moral normativity, that is, 
moral requirement, moral permissibility, and so forth (as opposed to rational requirement, 
rational permissibility, and so forth). I will often omit the term “moral” for brevity. 
 
I. Praiseworthiness and Impermissibility 
Many acts that are required are not praiseworthy.8 You are not praiseworthy for using turn 
signals while driving, though you are required to do so. Many acts that “go beyond” what is 
required are praiseworthy. You are praiseworthy for risking your life to save a stranger trapped 
in a burning building, though you are not required to do so. But sometimes praiseworthiness 
attaches to other sorts of acts. Some acts that are required are praiseworthy. You are 
praiseworthy for missing a nonrefundable international flight to take a seriously injured cyclist 
                                                          
8 Speaking of acts as being praiseworthy is only shorthand; ultimately it is agents who are praiseworthy. My 
primary focus here is the praiseworthiness of agents for performing certain acts for certain motivating reasons, as 
opposed to their praiseworthiness for having or displaying certain dispositions (see, for instance: Phillip 
Montague, “Acts, Agents, and Supererogation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989): 101–11; Arpaly 
2003, chapter 3; Markovits 2010; Massoud 2016).  
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to the hospital, and required to do so.9 And some acts that fall short of what is required—that 
is, that are impermissible—are praiseworthy, at least to some extent. Here are three putative 
examples. 
 Suppose that adopting a vegan diet is both required and praiseworthy. It might then 
seem that making a considerable effort but falling short—becoming a lacto-vegetarian rather 
than a vegan—is at least to some extent praiseworthy. Much of what would make it 
praiseworthy to go vegan would appear to be present in such a case of going merely vegetarian. 
It is at least arguable that the impermissibility of not fully meeting morality’s demand does not 
entirely cancel your praiseworthiness. Intuitively you remain worthy of at least some credit. 
 Here is another example: Suppose that you are required to go on strike. But, out of 
concern for your students, you decide to cross the picket line to go in and teach. Given the 
circumstances, teaching comes at a significant cost to you. It would appear we can fill in the 
particular details of the case so that it is plausible that teaching is at least somewhat 
praiseworthy, even though it is impermissible.  
 And a third example: You rob a bank at significant cost to yourself in order to give the 
money to the homeless stranger you encountered on your morning walk.10 Even if what you do 
is impermissible, and on the whole blameworthy, it still seems you are at least somewhat 
praiseworthy for your conduct. While it may be odd to say your act is a step in the direction of 
what morality demands, you do pay a significant cost in responding to a moral reason to help 
the stranger (your motivating reason for robbing the bank coincides with this normative 
                                                          
9 We can suppose you are the only person around to take the cyclist to the hospital. See: Massoud 2016 (692). For 
earlier discussion, see: J. O. Urmson, “Saints and Heroes,” in Essays in Moral Philosophy, edited by A. I. Melden 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), 198–216. 
10 For related examples, see: Michael Zimmerman, “A Plea for Ambivalence,” Metaphilosophy 24 (1993): 382–
89; Markovits 2010 (240–41).  
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reason—you did not rob the bank just for the thrill of it).11 It is arguably the fact that you put 
in significant effort or paid significant costs in responding to moral reasons that explains why 
you are at least somewhat praiseworthy in the two earlier examples as well. Though you would 
have been more responsive by going vegan instead of merely vegetarian, or by striking instead 
of teaching, you are nonetheless in each case significantly responsive to reasons.12 
 These examples suggest that we need to distinguish between being pro tanto 
praiseworthy and being overall praiseworthy. Let us say an agent is pro tanto praiseworthy for 
performing a token act for a token motivating reason when they are praiseworthy for some 
aspect of performing this act for this motivating reason (and likewise for being pro tanto 
blameworthy). An agent can at once be pro tanto praiseworthy for performing an act for a 
motivating reason—for example, robbing the bank to help the homeless stranger—and be pro 
tanto blameworthy for performing this same act for this same motivating reason. An agent is 
overall praiseworthy for performing an act for a motivating reason when, taking into account 
all of the praiseworthy and blameworthy aspects of doing so, they are on balance praiseworthy 
                                                          
11 I here build upon Massoud 2016 and Apraly 2003 (chapter 3). 
12 Raz 1975 (165–66) can be read as claiming that an act cannot be at all praiseworthy unless there is on balance 
most reason to do it, as opposed to merely a reason to do it. This would leave us unable to accommodate the 
“ambivalent” or “mixed” response it seems appropriate to have toward you for robbing the bank to help the 
homeless stranger (there is most reason to refrain from robbing the bank). We cannot satisfactorily accommodate 
this ambivalence by suggesting, as Raz 1975 (166) does, that we are simultaneously admiring one aspect of your 
character while regretting another. For we can suppose that your motivation to help the homeless stranger, though 
genuine, is out of character (see, for instance, Arpaly 2003 (94–5)). The most plausible explanation of the 
ambivalence is that you are praiseworthy for an aspect of your conduct, and blameworthy for another aspect of 
your conduct. We can instead read Raz as offering the more plausible claim that an act cannot be overall 
praiseworthy unless there is most reason to do it; the arguments for Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy offered below 
serve as arguments against this more plausible claim. 
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for doing so (and likewise for being overall blameworthy). No agent can at once be overall 
praiseworthy for performing an act for a motivating reason and be overall blameworthy for 
performing this same act for this same motivating reason.13 
What exactly it is to be overall praiseworthy will depend on what it is to be worthy of 
praise or blame for one’s conduct.14 We might, for instance, conceive of the latter as being 
deserving of credit or discredit. In the bank robbery case, you deserve some credit for helping 
the homeless stranger, but you deserve even more discredit for stealing money and harming 
innocent bystanders. Overall you deserve discredit for your conduct, which corresponds to the 
difference between the credit deserved for the good aspects of your conduct and the discredit 
deserved for the bad aspects of your conduct.15 We might instead conceive of being worthy of 
praise or blame as being the appropriate target of a positive or negative reactive attitude. It is 
appropriate to have a positive reactive attitude toward you for helping the homeless stranger, 
but it is also appropriate to have an even stronger negative reactive attitude toward you for 
stealing money and harming innocent bystanders. The appropriateness of such an ambivalent 
response may be compatible with the appropriateness of having a single higher-order attitude 
                                                          
13 Even if there are genuine moral dilemmas in which act A is required, act B is required, and you cannot do both, 
neither A nor B can at once be overall praiseworthy and overall blameworthy. In certain asymmetric dilemmas, it 
may be that A is overall praiseworthy and B is not. However, these would not be cases of the sort picked out by 
Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy, in which impermissible act A is more praiseworthy overall than permissible 
alternative B. In a genuine dilemma, no alternative is permissible. For putative examples, see: Michael Walzer, 
“Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1973): 160–180; Thomas 
Nagel, “War and Massacre,” reprinted in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 
53–74. 
14 For some of the various possible accounts, see footnote 3. 
15 The idea of overall credit deserved fits well with (though is not entailed by) Zimmerman’s 1988 (chapter 3) 
“ledger” metaphor. 
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toward you for your conduct as a whole (overall admiration, perhaps). But it may be that there 
is no single attitude it is appropriate to have toward your conduct as a whole, which corresponds 
to a “difference” or “average” between the reactive attitudes it is appropriate to have toward 
each aspect of your conduct. Even in the absence of any single overall appropriate attitude, we 
could say you are overall blameworthy as shorthand for the claim that the appropriate negative 
reactive attitude is relevantly stronger than the appropriate positive reactive attitude.16 I intend 
to remain neutral on these different possible conceptions of being worthy of praise and blame, 
and on the corresponding differences in how exactly to conceive of being overall praiseworthy. 
In what follows, I will occasionally write “praiseworthy” or “more praiseworthy” 
unaccompanied by either “pro tanto” or “overall.” The “overall” reading is intended only when 
explicitly indicated. 
It seems fairly uncontroversial that some acts are impermissible yet pro tanto 
praiseworthy. The vegetarianism, teaching, and bank robbery examples suggest so. More 
controversial is the claim that some acts are impermissible yet overall praiseworthy. The bank 
robbery example, at least, is not a case of this sort, as robbing the bank to help the homeless 
stranger is overall blameworthy. Are all unexcused impermissible acts overall blameworthy?  
I do not believe so. The aforementioned views which posit a necessary connection 
between unexcused impermissibility and blameworthiness do not support the claim that 
unexcused impermissible acts are necessarily overall blameworthy.17 To the extent that these 
views are plausible, they may support the weaker claim that all unexcused impermissible acts 
                                                          
16 I take it that it would still be an interesting claim that there are situations in which the positive reactive attitude 
it is appropriate to have toward you for some aspect of doing A is relevantly stronger than the negative reactive 
attitude it is appropriate to have toward you for some aspect of doing A (A is overall praiseworthy), even though 
A is impermissible and unexcused.  
17 See footnote 4 for literature on these views. 
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are necessarily pro tanto blameworthy, but they are orthogonal to the neglected question of 
how an impermissible act’s blameworthy aspects balance against its praiseworthy aspects. 
Robbing the bank is pro tanto blameworthy, perhaps partly in virtue of being impermissible, 
perhaps partly in virtue of (some of) the facts that make it impermissible. It is also pro tanto 
praiseworthy. But this act’s blameworthy aspect more than amply counterbalances its 
praiseworthy aspect. It is overall blameworthy.  
If the scales can tip one way, can they not tip the other? It seems they can. Consider 
again the vegetarianism example. Even if going vegan is what is required, it might be very 
praiseworthy to go all the way from carnivorism to vegetarianism, and only somewhat 
blameworthy to fall short of veganism. It could in this way be overall praiseworthy to go 
vegetarian, even if it is impermissible. For another putative example, suppose the reason to 
reduce our carbon emissions is strong enough that we are each required to eliminate air travel 
for leisure. Being an avid traveler, but who is nonetheless concerned about climate change, you 
do not eliminate your air travel, but limit it to once per year. Perhaps this is overall 
praiseworthy, even though impermissible. More generally, it seems that acts can be 
praiseworthy even if they are not most responsive to the reasons present—you can be worthy 
of “partial credit” for being only somewhat responsive, particularly if this is costly or difficult 
for you. Perhaps sometimes this partial credit is relevantly greater than the discredit deserved 
for falling short of what is required.  
 One might object that responding to reasons at cost to yourself is insufficient for being 
pro tanto praiseworthy. One might claim that, to be praiseworthy at all, you must do as much 
as required, if not more (what is required may be less than what there is most reason to do). If 
this claim is correct, the impermissible acts in the cases offered so far are not even pro tanto 
praiseworthy, let alone overall praiseworthy. In reply, we could note that it would seem a stingy 
view of praiseworthiness that implied you could sacrifice and sacrifice in response to moral 
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reasons and deserve no praise whatsoever for this if you still fall a bit short. But I need not 
insist on this reply. For in sections II and III I turn to acts that go beyond what is required, yet 
are at the same time impermissible.  
 In this section, I suggested that praiseworthiness can attach to impermissible acts. I 
presented examples in which impermissible acts seem pro tanto praiseworthy. Some of them 
might even involve acts that are impermissible and yet overall praiseworthy. But even if these 
are cases in which impermissible acts are overall praiseworthy, they are relatively tame ones: 
the impermissible acts in question are not more praiseworthy overall than permissible 
alternatives. The cases discussed in this section are therefore not of the form picked out by 
Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy, that is, situations in which it is overall praiseworthy to do an 
act A, and more so than it is to do a permissible and entirely blameless alternative B (B is not 
pro tanto blameworthy), even though A is impermissible and unexcused. In the following 
section, I offer a general framework illuminating how praiseworthiness can come apart from 
deontic status in this more radical way.  
 
II. Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy: A Framework 
In this section, I introduce a general framework illuminating how there can be cases of the form 
picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy. It consists of a familiar distinction between the 
act-properties of requiring reason and justification, and views about how these properties relate 
to praiseworthiness and blameworthiness respectively. I do not claim that this is the only 
framework within which cases of the form picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy can 
be generated and explained, but it strikes me as a fairly natural and useful one. 
First, requiring reason. I will use “a requiring reason” (count noun) to refer to an aspect 
of an act in a set of alternatives that contributes toward this act being required (impermissible 
not to do). That an act involves keeping a promise, for instance, tends to make this act required. 
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But the fact that there is a requiring reason to perform an act need not make it the case that it 
is required. After all, you may also have an even stronger requiring reason not to perform this 
act.18 The requiring reason not to let a child drown may be stronger than the requiring reason 
to keep your promise. I will say that there is “more requiring reason” (mass noun) to do act B 
than there is to do an alternative A when the respective requiring reasons to do B and A on 
balance make it the case that act A is impermissible, absent sufficient justification to do A. I 
will likewise take it that B is required whenever there is most requiring reason to do B, absent 
sufficient justification not to do B.19 
 Second, justification. Some considerations justify without requiring.20 If saving the life 
of a stranger unavoidably involved the loss of your legs, I take it there would be sufficient 
                                                          
18 Requiring reasons can thus be likened to Rossian prima facie (pro tanto) duties, which play a contributory role 
in the determination of all things considered duties. See: W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1930). Ross himself apologizes for the misleading phrase “prima facie” (20), as he intends to be 
referring not to appearances but to actual features that play a pro tanto or contributory role.   
19 I will here be using “more requiring reason” in a way according to which if there is more morally requiring 
reason to do B than there is to do A, then B is morally better than A. For an important discussion of how there can 
be more moral reason to do B than there is to do A even though A is morally better than B, see: Douglas Portmore, 
Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). On Portmore’s view, there is 
more reason to do B than there is to do A if the best “maximal option” that entails doing B is better than the best 
maximal option that entails doing A. But it can be that the best maximal option that entails doing B is better than 
the best maximal option that entails doing A even when A is itself better than B (see Portmore 2019, section 6.4, 
especially 210–13).  
20 On purely justifying considerations, see: Douglas Portmore, “Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?” Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2008): 369–88; Thomas Hurka and Esther Shubert, “Permissions to Do Less Than 
the Best: A Moving Band,” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 2 (2012): 1–27; Joshua Gert, “The Distinction 
Between Justifying and Requiring: Nothing to Fear,” in Weighing Reasons, eds. Errol Lord and Barry Maguire 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 157–172; Seth Lazar, “Accommodating Options,” Pacific 
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justification to refrain from doing so.21 You would be permitted but not required to refrain.22 If 
instead saving the life involved nothing more than the muddying of your shoes, there would 
still be some degree of justification to refrain from saving. But it would be insufficient, and the 
fact that there is significantly more requiring reason to save the life than there is to refrain 
would make it impermissible to refrain. In general, I understand justification to play the 
defensive role of preventing requiring reason from making acts impermissible. I take 
“justification to do A rather than B” (contrastive justification) to contribute toward it being the 
case that A would not be made impermissible by more requiring reason to do B.23 When there 
is “sufficient justification to do A rather than B,” A would not be made impermissible by more 
requiring reason to do B. And there is “sufficient justification to do A” when there is sufficient 
justification to do A rather than each of its alternatives.24 Thus it can turn out that there is 
                                                          
Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2019): 233–255. Purely morally justifying considerations are widely endorsed, and 
recall that my focus here is moral normativity (by “requiring reason” I mean “morally requiring reason,” and so 
on).  
21 On agent-relative prerogatives, see: Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982); Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Hurka and 
Shubert 2012; Lazar 2019. 
22 This is not to deny that you are prudentially required to keep your legs. Nor is it to deny that there is a morally 
requiring reason to keep your legs. The picture is instead that there is significantly more morally requiring reason 
to save the stranger at the cost of your legs than there is to do nothing, but that you are for all that not morally 
required to incur this cost, since there is sufficient moral justification to keep your legs. 
23 On contrastive reasons, see Justin Snedegar, Contrastive Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); on 
contrastive prerogatives, see Muñoz 2020. 
24 It is a feature of my setup that an act can be permissible even though there is insufficient justification to do it, 
if there is no more requiring reason to do anything else. That would be puzzling if we understood permissibility 
to entail justification, but I here understand justification merely as a property that serves to prevent another 
property (requiring reason) from making acts impermissible.  
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sufficient justification to do A rather than B, and yet, since there is insufficient justification to 
do A rather than C, there is insufficient justification to do A. If in addition there were more 
requiring reason to do C than there is to do A, then A would be impermissible.25  
 The remainder of the framework consists of two connections between reasons, 
justification, praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness. First, consider the following view about 
the relationship between requiring reasons, justification, and praiseworthiness. 
 
Praiseworthiness: Assuming relevant responsibility conditions are met, act A is 
praiseworthy if there are requiring reasons (count noun) to do A and there is justification 
not to do A, and is more praiseworthy, the stronger these reasons to do A, and the 
stronger this justification not to do A.  
 
Praiseworthiness is not offered as a complete account of praiseworthiness, but as a view 
identifying two factors that can amplify an act’s praiseworthiness.26 Perhaps there are other 
such factors.27 We may wish to add to Praiseworthiness that A is done for sufficiently good 
                                                          
25 I take the claim that alternative A is impermissible (full stop) to be equivalent to the claim that A is impermissible 
relative to the full set of available alternatives (A, B, C). Even if A is impermissible, it may well be permissible 
relative to the subset of available alternatives (A, B). That is, it may well be permissible to do A rather than B. 
One way of understanding such contrastive permissibility is in terms of conditional permissibility—that is, it 
being permissible to do A, conditional on not doing C (though C remains an available alternative). On the latter 
see: Theron Pummer, “All or Nothing, But If Not All, Next Best or Nothing,” The Journal of Philosophy 116 
(2019): 278–291. 
26 Unlike Praiseworthiness, Massoud’s 2016 account of praiseworthiness is only indirectly sensitive to requiring 
reasons (704–7). This difference does not matter for my main purposes here. 
27 For instance, perhaps the strength of the non-requiring reasons to do an act can also amplify its praiseworthiness, 
or perhaps (only) unusual responsiveness to requiring reasons is praiseworthy. On non-requiring reasons, see: 
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motivating reasons (that, for instance, your motivating reasons for doing A coincide with 
normative reasons to do A). Praiseworthiness is offered as a coarse-grained view identifying 
two factors relevant to praiseworthiness. It is intended to be compatible with a range of fine-
grained views about the nature and specific amplifying roles of these factors. For instance, on 
one view, only cost-based justification not to perform A (to perform some alternative rather 
than A) is relevant to praiseworthiness; on another view, other sorts of justification are relevant 
too. On one view, you cannot be pro tanto praiseworthy for performing A if it is costless for 
you to do so, even if there are very strong requiring reasons to do A; on another, you can be. 
On one view, the reasons to do A fix an upper limit on A’s praiseworthiness, however costly it 
is for you to do A; on another, the costliness of doing A can amplify A’s praiseworthiness 
without any such upper limit. And so forth. 
Next consider the following view about the relationship between requiring reason, 
justification, and blameworthiness. 
  
Blameworthiness: Assuming relevant responsibility conditions are met, act A is 
blameworthy if it is not the alternative there is most requiring reason (mass noun) to do 
and there is insufficient justification to do A, and is more blameworthy, the greater the 
                                                          
James Dreier, “Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t,” in Satisficing and 
Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, edited by Michael Byron (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 131–154; Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, “Untying a knot from the inside out: reflections on the 
‘paradox’ of supererogation,” Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2010): 29–63; Margaret Little and Coleen 
Macnamara, “For better or worse: commendatory reasons and latitude,” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7 
(2017): 138–160. On unusualness, see: Urmson 1958, Julia Markovits, “Saints, Heroes, Sages, and Villains,” 
Philosophical Studies 158 (2012): 289–311; McElwee 2017. 
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shortfall in requiring reason between A and the alternative there is most requiring reason 
to do, and the weaker this insufficient justification to do A. 
 
The basic idea behind Blameworthiness is that you are pro tanto blameworthy for falling short 
of what there is most requiring reason to do, absent sufficient justification, and that 
blameworthiness is amplified by the degrees to which requiring reason and justification fall 
short. We can, for instance, take the degree to which the requiring reason to do an act falls short 
of what there is most requiring reason to do, and multiply it by the degree to which the 
justification to do this act falls short of sufficient justification. As long as the latter is zero, that 
is, as long as there is sufficient justification for failing to do what there is most requiring reason 
to do, you are fully insulated from blame, regardless of the degree of shortfall in terms of 
requiring reason.28 There is an important but commonsensical asymmetry between 
Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness. Whereas you are to various degrees praiseworthy for 
making sacrifices in response to individual requiring reasons, you need not be at all 
blameworthy for failing to respond to individual requiring reasons. Blameworthiness for failing 
                                                          
28 Some have argued that there are cases in which an act is blameworthy even though there is sufficient justification 
to do it (see Driver 1992). Blameworthiness can be modified to accommodate these cases by distinguishing 
between the level of justification needed to render an act permissible and the level of justification needed to render 
it entirely blameless. Alternatively, Blameworthiness can be formulated in terms of cost-based justification in a 
way that leaves room for cases in which one’s failure to help someone in need is made permissible by one’s 
property rights (ownership-based justification), yet one is still blameworthy for not helping because it would have 
been costless to do so. 
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to respond to a requiring reason gets “switched off” if you do what there is most requiring 
reason to do, or, failing that, if you do an alternative for which there is sufficient justification.29 
This general framework consisting of requiring reasons, justification, 
Praiseworthiness, and Blameworthiness—together with the distinction between being pro tanto 
praiseworthy and being overall praiseworthy—gives us the tools needed to generate cases of 
the form picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy. To see this, suppose you have three 
alternatives: stick with the status quo (carnivorism), go vegetarian, and go vegan. Let us assume 
that the relevant reason and justification properties are as follows: it is costly enough for you 
to go either vegetarian or vegan that there is sufficient justification for the status quo; since it 
is no costlier to you to go vegan than vegetarian, there is insufficient justification to go 
vegetarian rather than vegan; there is no requiring reason to stick with the status quo, strong 
requiring reason to go vegetarian, and somewhat stronger requiring reason to go vegan. Given 
all this, it is impermissible to go vegetarian, permissible to stick with the status quo, and 
permissible to go vegan; nonetheless Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness can together 
imply that the praiseworthiness of going vegetarian relevantly exceeds its blameworthiness. It 
can thus turn out to be overall praiseworthy to go vegetarian, and more so than remaining 
carnivorous, even when the former is impermissible and the latter is permissible. We can in 
this way have a case of the form picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy, if the relevant 
reason and justification properties are as stipulated above. 
 The framework presented in this section shows how cases of the form picked out by 
Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy are conceptually possible. To move beyond mere conceptual 
possibility, we need cases in which the relevant reason and justification properties are not 
                                                          
29 Failing to respond to requiring reasons may leave various forms of moral residue, even when not pro tanto 
blameworthy. For example, while you are not pro tanto blameworthy for breaking a promise in order to save a 
drowning child, perhaps you have to compensate the promisee (Ross 1930, 28).  
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merely stipulated or assumed. In the following section, I work through a series of “emergency 
rescue” cases some of which plausibly are of the form picked out by Impermissible Yet 
Praiseworthy. However, it is not my primary aim to persuade readers that the particular cases 
I will focus on are of the form picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy. Instead my main 
aim is to provide, by way of illustration, a more robust defense of the central claim that there 
are some cases of the form picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy (even if none of the 
particular ones I discuss are). The general framework of this section, together with the 
particular cases of the following section, should give readers a clear enough idea of how to 
construct their own cases that fit the relevant form.  
 
III. Rescue Cases 
With our basic framework in place, we can proceed to some emergency rescue cases that are 
illustrative of the form picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy. To help minimize noise, 
let us consider idealized cases in which potentially relevant considerations not explicitly 
mentioned are held constant or bracketed appropriately.30 We can, for instance, suppose that 
those in need of rescue are innocent and have serious interests in continuing to live, that 
potential rescuers are relevantly informed, and that performing a given rescue does not affect 
one’s abilities or opportunities to help others in the future.31 Let us begin with the following 
case.32 
                                                          
30 Readers are invited to fill in more concrete details of these cases as they like, so long as they take care not to 
introduce confounding factors. 
31 To appreciate the significance of this last qualification, see, for example, Portmore 2019 (section 6.4). 
32 For similar or relevant cases see: Charles Fried and Derek Parfit, “Correspondence,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 8 (1979), 393–397; Derek Parfit, “Future Generations: Further Problems,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
11 (1982): 113–72, 131; Kagan 1989, 16; Douglas Portmore, “Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism,” 
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Costly No-Conflict: Two strangers face a deadly threat. You can do nothing, sacrifice 
your legs in a way that would save one stranger, or sacrifice your legs in another way 
that would save both.  
 
In Costly No-Conflict, there is significantly more requiring reason to save the greater number 
than there is to do either alternative. Nonetheless, there is sufficient justification to do nothing. 
Even if the cost is due entirely to immediate pain, transitional factors, and social injustice, the 
cost of losing a limb is a serious one. I take it this cost is great enough to make it permissible 
                                                          
Philosophical Studies 138 (2008): 409–427, 420–21; Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations 
of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 161–62; Theron Pummer, “Whether and Where to 
Give,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 44 (2016): 77–95; Joe Horton, “The All or Nothing Problem,” The Journal 
of Philosophy 114 (2017): 94–104; Jeff McMahan, “Doing Good and Doing the Best,” in The Ethics of Giving, 
edited by Paul Woodruff (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018): 78–102; Thomas Sinclair, “Are We 
Conditionally Obligated to Be Effective Altruists?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (2018): 36–59; Portmore 
2019, section 6.4; Helen Frowe, “If You’ll Be My Bodyguard: Agreements to Save and the Duty to Minimize 
Harm,” Ethics 129 (2019): 204–229, 210; Ralf Bader, “Agent-Relative Prerogatives and Suboptimal 
Beneficence,” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 9 (2019): 223–250; Muñoz 2020. Not all of these authors 
discuss cases with the same structure as those that are of interest to me here. In some of these cases, one faces a 
series of choices over time: first one can either incur a personal cost to help others, or not, and if one does incur 
the cost, one can then at a later time choose whether to help more at no additional personal cost. In the cases that 
are of interest to me here, one faces a single choice in which one can either incur a personal cost to help others, 
incur a personal cost that is no greater to help more, or incur no personal cost by helping no one at all. The 
dialectical importance of the distinction between these sorts of cases in part depends on whether it is possible to 
argue for conclusions about the single choice cases on the basis of claims about the series of choices cases 
(McMahan 2018 and Bader 2019 discuss the extent to which it is).  
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not to sacrifice your legs to save two strangers.33 At the same time, it seems impermissible to 
save the lesser number (one stranger) instead of saving the greater number (both strangers).34 
This would be so if there were insufficient justification to save the lesser number. 
Is there insufficient justification to save the lesser number in Costly No-Conflict? The 
most pressing question here is whether there is sufficient justification to save the lesser number 
rather than save the greater number, as there is significantly more requiring reason to save the 
greater number than there is to save the lesser number. There is no plausible cost-based 
justification to save the lesser number rather than save the greater number, as saving the greater 
number is in no respect costlier to you.  
Perhaps instead you have ownership-based (or autonomy-based) justification to use 
your body (or, more broadly, live your life) in one way instead of the other, even though the 
cost to you would be the same in every respect, whichever of these two acts you do.35 First, 
even granting that the fact that your body is yours can sometimes provide some justification to 
do one act rather than another, it is controversial that it can when these acts are just as costly 
                                                          
33 We can suppose the cost is greater if we doubt this is enough. My main arguments also hold independently of 
what it is that is being sacrificed—be it limbs, lives, time, safety, money, effort, or projects. On intuitions about 
losing limbs (to help others), see: Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland, “How Much for the Child?” Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2013): 189–204; Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “Barry and Øverland on Singer and 
assistance-based duties,” Ethics and Global Politics 12 (2019): 15–23; Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body: A 
Theory of Disability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
34 There is some experimental philosophy that suggests this intuition is widely shared. See [redacted]. 
35 On ownership-based justification or similar, see: Seana Shiffrin, “Moral Autonomy and Agent-Centered 
Options,” Analysis 51 (1991): 244–54; Frances Kamm, “Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, 
and the Significance of Status,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992): 354–89; Fiona Woollard, Doing and 
Allowing Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Seth Lazar, “Moral Status and Agent-Centred Options,” 
Utilitas 31 (2019): 83–105.  
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to you in every respect. Second, it is particularly controversial whether there is any such 
justification to save the lesser number rather than save the greater number in Costly No-
Conflict, since here your altruistic alternatives do not differ at all with respect to how you use 
your body (apart from the effects of how it is used on the number of strangers saved). Third, 
even if we grant that there is some such justification to save the lesser number, it seems 
implausible that it is sufficient to prevent the fact that there is significantly more requiring 
reason to save the greater number from making it impermissible to save the lesser number. 
Such justification would, after all, seem insufficient to prevent the significantly greater 
requiring reason to save the greater number from making it impermissible to save the lesser 
number in a variant of Costly No-Conflict in which saving either the one stranger or both costs 
you nothing but involves the use of what is yours (at least as long as it is the same use either 
way). 
In sum, in Costly No-Conflict, there is significantly more requiring reason to save the 
greater number than there is to do either alternative. But while there is sufficient justification 
to do nothing, there is insufficient justification to save the lesser number. It is impermissible to 
save the lesser number and permissible to do nothing. To determine whether Costly No-Conflict 
is illustrative of the form picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy, we need to ask 
whether it is overall praiseworthy to save the lesser (and more so than doing nothing). 
Although heroic life-saving acts are paradigmatically praiseworthy, they can fail to be 
overall or even pro tanto praiseworthy—and can be pro tanto or even overall blameworthy 
instead—if done for sufficiently bad motivating reasons. It is plausible that you would be 
overall blameworthy for saving the lesser number in Costly No-Conflict if you acted out of a 
combination of concern for the one stranger and unjustifiable hate for the other.36 By the same 
                                                          
36 This is how both Horton 2017 (94) and McMahan 2018 (94–9) characterize Costly No-Conflict. 
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token, bad motivating reasons could render you blameworthy for doing nothing or for saving 
the greater number, even though these acts would remain permissible.37 For instance, you may 
be blameworthy for doing nothing out of unjustified hate for the strangers you could save, but 
not for doing nothing out of concern for your legs. To simplify, I will here limit my focus to 
cases in which permissible acts are done for the best motivating reasons available. Is the best 
available motivating reason for saving the lesser number good enough for you to be at least pro 
tanto praiseworthy for doing so? 
Arguably the best—least bad—available motivating reason for saving the lesser 
number in Costly No-Conflict is what I call “completely innumerate altruism.” That is, you are 
moved to help someone, but are indifferent to how many. You are fully aware of and moved 
by the plights of each, but in any given choice situation you are not moved more by more plights 
than fewer.38 Equally moved to save just one as you are to save both, your choice to save 
                                                          
37 See Scanlon 2008 and Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 132. 
38 You are thus not moved more by more plights than fewer, whether it is a case of two rather than one, or two 
million rather than one. A more intermediate possibility is that you are indifferent to how many you help in no-
conflict cases only if the (difference in) number is below some finite threshold. I will set aside possibilities like 
these and focus on the simpler motivating reason of completely innumerate altruism (when I turn to other sorts of 
cases—such as conflict cases—I will consider other motivating reasons for saving the lesser number). Completely 
innumerate altruism may be seen as a motivational reflection of these ancient thoughts: “Whosoever preserves a 
single soul … scripture ascribes as much [merit] to him as if he had preserved a complete world” (Talmud: 
Sanhedrin 37a) and “… whosoever saves the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all of mankind” 
(Quran 5:32). It may also be seen as a motivational reflection of the (related) thought that each person’s life is of 
infinite moral value, so that the moral value of saving just one person is equivalent to that of saving an arbitrarily 
large group of people that contains this same person. 
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someone culminates in arbitrarily picking “just one.”39 Your innumerate altruism is anonymous 
in that you would be equally moved to save just one as you are to save both were the positions 
of the two swapped. Finally, your innumerate altruistic motivation is quite a powerful one, 
taking precedence over your strong motivation to keep your legs. Is it irrational to be so moved 
by the plights of each but not moved more by the plights of more?40 It would appear so, but not 
in a way that renders praise and blame inapt. Similarly, it seems irrational to be moved by the 
plights of each but not moved by plights that would occur on Tuesdays. But for all that you can 
be praiseworthy for preventing a Monday harm, and blameworthy for allowing a Tuesday 
harm.    
It seems that completely innumerate altruism is not a bad enough motivating reason to 
prevent saving the lesser number from being pro tanto praiseworthy. Praiseworthiness then 
implies you are pro tanto praiseworthy for saving the lesser number out of completely 
innumerate altruism. After all, in saving the lesser number you are heroically sacrificing your 
legs in response to a requiring reason to help someone.  
 But even if it is pro tanto praiseworthy to save the lesser number out of completely 
innumerate altruism—as seems plausible—it is not clear that this is overall praiseworthy, or 
more so than doing nothing (which is not pro tanto praiseworthy). After all, in saving the lesser 
number you also allow someone else to die gratuitously, in that your available alternative of 
                                                          
39 Perhaps you cannot be responsible for arbitrarily picking one alternative over another, insofar as that does not 
constitute a choice. You nonetheless can be responsible for your choice to save someone by arbitrarily picking.  
40 On rationality and saving the lesser number, see: Véronique Munoz-Dardé, “The Distribution of Numbers and 
the Comprehensiveness of Reasons,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2005): 191–217; Tom 
Dougherty, “Rational numbers: a non-consequentialist explanation of why you should save the many and not the 
few,” Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2013): 413–427; Kieran Setiya, “Love and the Value of a Life,” Philosophical 
Review 123 (2014): 251–80.  
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not allowing them to die is at least as favorable in every respect.41 This would seem to make 
for a rather substantial shortfall in requiring reason between saving the lesser number and 
saving the greater number. Given this, and that there is insufficient justification to save the 
lesser number, Blameworthiness has the plausible implication that you are substantially 
blameworthy for saving the lesser number out of completely innumerate altruism. It is not clear 
that the praiseworthiness of saving the lesser number is great enough to counterbalance this 
blameworthiness. 
Costly No-Conflict does not provide clear support for Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy. 
But the foregoing discussion puts us in a good position to consider some further, and more 
promising, cases. Consider: 
 
Red/Green No-Conflict: You can do nothing, press a red button thereby saving the 
lives of ten strangers, or press a green button thereby saving the lives of these same ten 
strangers and saving another stranger’s finger. Pressing either button will also cause 
you to drop into a fiery pit and die.42 
 
Arguably the best available motivating reason for pressing the red button is what I call 
“innumerate smaltruism.” That is, whenever you are confronted with a mix of big plights (such 
as deaths) and relatively small plights (such as lost fingers), you are moved by the plights of 
each, moved more by more big plights than fewer, but not moved more by only a few more 
relatively small plights than fewer. Innumerate smaltruism seems a better motivating reason 
                                                          
41 By “at least as favorable in every respect,” I intend to include non-moral (prudential) respects. 
42 This is a version of Pummer’s 2019 case. Dying usually removes all opportunities to help in the future. We can 
suppose that in this case there are no opportunities to help in the future anyway. 
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than completely innumerate altruism.43 Given this, and that pressing the red button constitutes 
making an enormous sacrifice (your life) in response to very strong requiring reasons (to save 
ten people), Praiseworthiness has the plausible implication that pressing the red button out of 
innumerate smaltruism is very praiseworthy. As pressing the red button also allows someone 
to lose a finger gratuitously, the shortfall in requiring reason between pressing the red button 
and pressing the green button is—though significant—relatively small. Blameworthiness has 
the plausible implication that it is only somewhat blameworthy to press the red button. It thus 
seems plausible that you are overall praiseworthy for pressing the red button, and more so than 
you are for doing nothing (which is not pro tanto praiseworthy). Insofar as it is impermissible 
to press the red button and permissible to do nothing, Red/Green No-Conflict would therefore 
appear to support Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy.44 
 The explanation of why it is impermissible to save the lesser number yet permissible to 
do nothing in Costly No-Conflict is instructive here. Even though the harm of a lost finger is 
small relative to the harm of death, it seems there is significant requiring reason to prevent the 
loss of a finger, and indeed that in Red/Green No-Conflict there is significantly more requiring 
                                                          
43 To the extent that the manifestation of dispositions matters for blameworthiness, a completely innumerate 
altruist would be more blameworthy for pressing the red button in Red/Green No-Conflict than an innumerate 
smaltruist would be. 
44 One may wonder whether what is doing the intuitive work in this case is the fact that it is not obvious (to you, 
the protagonist) that it is impermissible to press the red button. After all, some hold that moral ignorance mitigates 
blameworthiness in the way empirical ignorance does. On my view, you can be overall praiseworthy for pressing 
the red button, even if you correctly believe that it is impermissible to do so. As explained in section II, you can 
be both pro tanto praiseworthy and pro tanto blameworthy for performing a token act. For further discussion of 
moral ignorance, see, for instance: Gideon Rosen, “Culpability and ignorance,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 103 (2003), 61–84; Elinor Mason, “Moral ignorance and blameworthiness,” Philosophical Studies 172 
(2015): 3037–3057.  
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reason to press the green button than to press the red button.45 There is sufficient justification 
to press neither button rather than press either.46 Is there sufficient justification to press the red 
button (that is, save the lesser number) in Red/Green No-Conflict? That there is sufficient cost-
based or ownership-based justification to save the lesser number is just as implausible in this 
case as it is in Costly No-Conflict, but we might wonder whether some further type of 
justification is available in Red/Green No-Conflict. After all, it seems very good to press either 
button. Perhaps there is sufficient justification to do A rather than B, even though there is 
significantly more requiring reason to do B than there is to do A, when A is good enough.47 And 
perhaps pressing the red button is good enough. There may be cases in which such satisficing 
justification renders it permissible to fail to do what there is significantly more requiring reason 
to do. But it does not seem plausible that there is sufficient satisficing justification to press the 
red button in Red/Green No-Conflict, as pressing the red button allows someone to lose a finger 
gratuitously. More generally, when acts A and B are perfectly alike but for the fact that A allows 
significant harm gratuitously whereas B does not, it seems there cannot be sufficient satisficing 
justification to do A rather than B, no matter how good A is.48 In sum, the requiring and 
justifying considerations present in Red/Green No-Conflict together support the claim that it is 
impermissible to press the red button and permissible to do nothing. So Red/Green No-Conflict 
appears to support Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy. There are further cases. 
                                                          
45 If a lost finger seems too small a harm, we can instead make it a lost hand or arm. Also note that Kamm 2007 
would not count the finger as an “irrelevant good” here, since the people whose lives you can save by pressing 
the red button are the same as those whose lives you can save by pressing the green button.  
46 If you doubt this, you can retell the case so that pressing either button would cause you even greater agony, 
serious non-hedonic harm, the destruction of your life projects, and so forth. 
47 An act or outcome might be said to be “good enough” in absolute terms or relative to available alternatives. For 
discussion, see: Thomas Hurka, “Two Kinds of Satisficing,” Philosophical Studies 59 (1990): 107–111. 
48 Insofar as “good enough” entails “sufficient justification,” A cannot be good enough.  
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The practical relevance of this paper would be substantially limited if the only plausible 
cases of impermissible acts that are overall praiseworthy, and more so than permissible 
alternatives, involved allowing harm gratuitously out of innumerate smaltruism. In most real-
world cases we are unable to help everyone at once; when saving the larger group precludes 
(rather than includes) saving the smaller group, saving the smaller group does not constitute 
allowing harm gratuitously.49 Consider two cases that have this feature. 
 
Costless Conflict: Three strangers face a deadly threat. You can, at no cost to yourself, 
save one of them or save the other two. Tragically, you cannot save all three. 
 
Costly Conflict: Three strangers face a deadly threat. You can do nothing, sacrifice 
your legs in a way that would save one stranger, or sacrifice your legs in another way 
that would save the other two. 
 
The claim that it is impermissible to save the lesser number in Costless Conflict is somewhat 
controversial.50 The claim that it is impermissible to save the lesser number in Costly Conflict 
                                                          
49 See Horton 2017, McMahan 2018, and Sinclair 2018 on charitable giving. 
50 For views according to which it is permissible to save the lesser number in Costless Conflict, see: Elizabeth 
Anscombe, “Who is Wronged?” Oxford Review 5 (1967): 16–17; John Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1977): 293–316; Munoz-Dardé 2005; Tyler Doggett, “Saving the Few,” Noûs 
47 (2013): 302–315. On deciding by lot, see: John Broome, “Fairness,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
91 (1990): 87–101; Ben Bradley, “Saving People and Flipping Coins,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 
3 (2009): 1–13. For defenses of the popular view that you are required to save the greater number, see: Derek 
Parfit, “Innumerate Ethics,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978): 285–301; Frances Kamm, Morality, 
Mortality, Vol. 1: Death and Whom to Save from It (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); T. M. Scanlon, 
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is accordingly somewhat more controversial than the claim that it is impermissible to save the 
lesser number in Costly No-Conflict. Whereas in Costly No-Conflict saving the lesser number 
constitutes allowing significant harm gratuitously, in Costly Conflict saving the lesser number 
does not constitute allowing significant harm gratuitously. In the latter case, the fact that you 
would save that one stranger at least significantly favors saving the lesser number without also 
favoring any other alternative (particular individuals matter above and beyond the amounts of 
well-being instantiated in their lives). 
 Nonetheless, I hold that it is impermissible to save the lesser number in Costless 
Conflict. Since a proper defense of this claim lies beyond the scope of this paper, I will just 
assert it here. But it is important to emphasize that we need not claim that what makes it 
impermissible to save the lesser number in cases like Costless Conflict and Costly Conflict is 
that there is more requiring reason to produce impartially better outcomes and insufficient 
justification not to do just that.51 Though saving the life of a joyful person may produce an 
impartially better outcome than would saving the life of a bored person, it seems permissible 
to save the latter instead of the former (at least, assuming their lives are worth continuing and 
they have serious interests in continuing them).52 It would also seem permissible to save the 
life of the bored person instead of both saving the life of the joyful person and saving someone 
else’s finger. It is plausible that, when there is a conflict between saving X’s life and saving 
                                                          
What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Michael Otsuka, “Skepticism about 
saving the greater number,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (2004): 413–426; Dougherty 2013. 
51 See Sinclair’s 2018 response to Pummer 2016 and Horton 2017 on this score. 
52 See Doggett 2013 and Frances Kamm, “Aggregation, Allocating Scarce Resources, and the Disabled,” Social 
Philosophy and Policy 26 (2009), 148–97. 
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Y’s life, adding Z’s finger to either side of the scales cannot by itself make it impermissible to 
save those on the opposite side.53 
At the same time, I take it that adding Z’s life to (say) Y’s side of the scales can make 
it impermissible to save X’s life instead of saving the lives of both Y and Z. What makes it 
impermissible to save the lesser number in Costless Conflict is that there is significantly more 
requiring reason to save the lives of two people than there is to save the life of one other person, 
and insufficient justification to save the lesser number. It seems there is likewise significantly 
more requiring reason to save the greater number than there is to save the lesser number in 
Costly Conflict. And that there is sufficient justification to save the lesser number is just as 
implausible in Costly Conflict as it is in previous cases.54 
Like Costly No-Conflict, Costly Conflict is a case in which it is impermissible to save 
the lesser number, though permissible to do nothing. But there are two important differences 
that plausibly make it significantly less blameworthy to save the lesser number in Costly 
                                                          
53 Recall that in Red/Green No-Conflict the red button and the green button save the lives of the same people, so 
the fact that the green button also saves a finger does make it impermissible to press the red button. 
54 There is a potential disanalogy when it comes to satisficing justification, as in response to the suggestion that 
there is sufficient satisficing justification to save the lesser number in Red/Green No-Conflict I appealed to the 
fact that saving the lesser number allows significant harm gratuitously. But it also seems plausible that when acts 
A and B are perfectly alike but for the fact that A allows strangers Y and Z to die whereas B allows stranger X to 
die, there cannot be sufficient satisficing justification to do A rather than B, no matter how good A is. This last 
claim is compatible with the view that it is permissible to save the lives of ten strangers along with X’s life instead 
of saving the lives of ten different strangers along with the lives of Y and Z (acts are less alike when they involve 
saving different people). It is also compatible with the possibility of cases in which there is sufficient satisficing 
justification to do A rather than B, where A and B are perfectly alike but for the fact that A allows strangers Y and 
Z to each lose a finger whereas B allows stranger X to lose a finger (and there is significantly more requiring 
reason to do B than there is to do A).   
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Conflict than it is to do so in Costly No-Conflict. First, because in Costly Conflict the requiring 
reason (count noun) to save the one is in conflict with the requiring reasons to save the two, 
there is less of a shortfall in requiring reason (mass noun) between saving the lesser number 
and saving the greater number in Costly Conflict than there is in Costly No-Conflict. Given this, 
Blameworthiness has the plausible implication that it is less blameworthy to save the lesser 
number in Costly Conflict than it is to do so in Costly No-Conflict. Second, while it seems that 
the best available motivating reason for saving the lesser number in Costly No-Conflict is that 
of completely innumerate altruism—you are moved to help someone, but are anonymously 
indifferent to how many you help—there are better motivating reasons available for saving the 
lesser number in Costly Conflict. You might save the lesser number in the latter case out of 
“moderately innumerate altruism.” That is, you might be moved by the plights of each and 
indeed moved more by the plights of more, but not moved more by the plights of the many 
than by the plights of the few, insofar as the few are different from the many (equally moved 
to save the one as you are to save the other two, you arbitrarily pick “the one”). Or, perhaps 
better still, you might save the lesser number out of “singular altruism.” That is, you might be 
moved to save the one on the basis of some singular thought about them or their particular 
plight, such as “Lorraine is drowning.”55 Arguably the blameworthiness of saving the lesser 
number in Costly No-Conflict is aggravated by the fact that the best motivating reason available 
for doing so—completely innumerate altruism—involves disregarding the number of 
individual plights. By contrast, moderately innumerate altruism and singular altruism do not 
                                                          
55 Obviously the details of Costly Conflict will determine whether it is possible for your motivating reason for 
saving the lesser number to be a singular thought (this may be impossible if those you can rescue are hidden 
behind a curtain). For further discussion, see: Setiya 2014; Philip Pettit, “Love and Its Place in Moral Discourse,” 
in Love Analyzed, edited by Roger Lamb (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 153–63.  
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involve disregarding the number of plights, but failing to appropriately balance competing 
plights.  
While in Costly No-Conflict it is not clear that the praiseworthiness of saving the lesser 
number is great enough to counterbalance the blameworthiness of doing so, in Costly Conflict 
it is plausible that the praiseworthiness of saving the lesser number can be great enough to 
counterbalance the blameworthiness of doing so. The latter appears to support Impermissible 
Yet Praiseworthy. Some further cases appear more compelling still. Consider: 
 
Red/Green Conflict: You can do nothing, press a red button thereby saving the lives of 
ten strangers and saving the life of stranger X, or press a green button thereby saving 
the lives of these same ten strangers and saving the lives of strangers Y and Z. Pressing 
either button will also cause you to drop into a fiery pit and die. 
 
As in Costly Conflict, it seems there is significantly more requiring reason to save the greater 
number (press the green button) than there is to save the lesser number (press the red button). 
And the reasons offered above in support of the claim that there is insufficient justification to 
save the lesser number in Costly Conflict likewise support the claim that there is insufficient 
justification to save the lesser number in Red/Green Conflict. So it is plausible to claim that it 
is impermissible to press the red button in Red/Green Conflict. But, at least assuming your 
motivating reason is something in the vicinity of moderately innumerate altruism or singular 
altruism, it seems plausible that you are overall praiseworthy for pressing the red button, and 
more so than doing nothing. After all, the blameworthiness of pressing the red button in this 
case seems no greater than that of saving the lesser number in Costly Conflict, while the 
praiseworthiness of pressing the red button seems considerably greater than that of saving the 
lesser number in Costly Conflict. 
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Similar remarks apply to the following variant, which could convince those who believe 
it is permissible to save the lesser number in conflict cases (assuming they agree that there is 
more requiring reason to save one stranger’s life than there is to save another’s legs). 
 
Equinumerous Red/Green Conflict: You can do nothing, press a red button thereby 
saving the lives of ten strangers and saving stranger X’s legs, or press a green button 
thereby saving the lives of these same ten strangers and saving stranger Y’s life. 
Pressing either button will also cause you to drop into a fiery pit and die. 
 
In sum, while Costly No-Conflict does not provide clear support for Impermissible Yet 
Praiseworthy, it is plausible that a variety of other cases do—including Costly Conflict, but 
perhaps especially Red/Green No-Conflict, Red/Green Conflict, and Equinumerous Red/Green 
Conflict. 
 
IV. The Limits of Praiseworthiness 
In section I, I presented cases in which praiseworthiness appears to attach to impermissible 
acts. These impermissible acts seem pro tanto praiseworthy, and some might even be overall 
praiseworthy. In sections II and III, I showed how praiseworthiness might come apart from 
deontic status in the more radical way described by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy—
impermissible acts might not only be overall praiseworthy, but more so than permissible 
alternatives. In this section, I will suggest that there may nonetheless be limits on when 
impermissible acts can be overall praiseworthy. The holding of such limits will constrain the 
form that cases picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy can take. 
 33 
 
 According to the First Limit, for an act to be pro tanto praiseworthy, it must meet or 
exceed what is required.56 That is, there must be at least as much reason to do this act as there 
is to do a permissible alternative (you are required to do some or other permissible alternative). 
In section I, I presented examples of acts that are impermissible and yet seemingly pro tanto 
praiseworthy (the vegetarianism, teaching, and bank robbery examples). The First Limit 
implies that these acts are in fact not pro tanto praiseworthy—insofar as you are required to go 
vegan rather than vegetarian, the latter is not praiseworthy. The rescue cases discussed in 
section III are different. Saving the lesser number in cases like Red/Green No-Conflict, Costly 
Conflict, and Red/Green Conflict is more responsive to the balance of reasons than is 
required—there is more reason to save the lesser number than there is to permissibly save no 
one. These cases provide us with acts that in this way go beyond what is required, yet are 
impermissible. The First Limit does not imply that these impermissible acts cannot be pro tanto 
praiseworthy, and so does not present an obstacle to my argument for Impermissible Yet 
Praiseworthy. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, the First Limit seems a somewhat stingy view 
of praiseworthiness in that it implies you could sacrifice and sacrifice in response to moral 
reasons and deserve no praise whatsoever for this if you still fall a bit short. 
 According to the Second Limit, then, for an act to be overall praiseworthy, it must meet 
or exceed what is required. Like the First Limit, the Second Limit is compatible with the 
argument I provided for Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy (in the rescue cases in section III, the 
impermissible act of saving the lesser number exceeds what is required). But the Second Limit 
is a less stingy view in that it is compatible with the intuition that you can be somewhat 
                                                          
56 We might more extremely claim that, for an act to be pro tanto praiseworthy, it must exceed what is required. 
This claim conflicts with the intuition (noted in section I) that you are praiseworthy for missing a nonrefundable 
international flight to take a seriously injured cyclist to the hospital, even though this meets but does not exceed 
what is required. 
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praiseworthy for making substantial sacrifices in response to moral reasons even if you fall 
short of what you are required to do (by, for example, going vegetarian rather than vegan). The 
Second Limit has seemingly plausible implications in further cases as well. 
Consider a variant of the bank robbery example from earlier: you can either at no cost 
to yourself do nothing, or at significant cost to yourself press a button that saves the homeless 
stranger’s legs yet simultaneously causes two innocent bank employees to lose their legs. These 
are the only available alternatives. I take it there is a requiring reason to press the button, most 
requiring reason to do nothing, and insufficient justification to press the button. 
Praiseworthiness implies that pressing the button is pro tanto praiseworthy, and 
Blameworthiness implies pressing the button is pro tanto blameworthy. It is plausible that this 
act’s blameworthiness is relevantly greater than its praiseworthiness, and that it is therefore 
overall blameworthy. But, according to Praiseworthiness, holding fixed the requiring reasons 
to press the button, it is more praiseworthy to press the button, the greater the cost to you of 
pressing it. Couldn’t this praiseworthiness then grow very large, if it cost you an awful lot to 
press the button? The Second Limit has the plausible implication that it is not overall 
praiseworthy to press the button, regardless of how costly it is for you to do so. Pressing the 
button does not meet or exceed what is required, which is to do nothing. There is more reason 
to do nothing than there is to press the button. 
 Nonetheless, it might seem that the Second Limit remains too stingy a view of 
praiseworthiness. After all, it implies that, if we are each required to eliminate air travel, you—
an avid traveler—cannot be overall praiseworthy for limiting your air travel to just once per 
year. We might have thought that the praiseworthiness of going so far in response to reasons 
at substantial cost to yourself is relevantly greater than the blameworthiness of not making it 
all the way to the level of responsiveness required. There is a third view that accommodates 
this thought, as well as has the plausible implication that it is not overall praiseworthy to press 
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the button in the variant of the bank robbery example, regardless of how costly it is for you to 
do so. 
 According to the Third Limit, if there is insufficient justification to do A rather than the 
alternative there is most requiring reason to do, then, for A to be overall praiseworthy, the 
difference between the reason to do A and the reason to do the alternative there is least reason 
to do must be sufficiently great relative to the difference between the reason to do A and the 
reason to do the alternative there is most reason to do. The basic idea here is that the 
blameworthiness of A for unjustifiably falling short of what there is most reason to do can be 
counterbalanced by enough praiseworthiness (to render A overall praiseworthy) only if A rises 
far enough above what there is least reason to do. The Third Limit is compatible with the 
thought that it is overall praiseworthy to limit your air travel to once per year, even if you are 
required to eliminate it altogether. The difference between the reason to limit your air travel to 
once per year and the reason to fly whenever you feel like it is much greater than the difference 
between the reason to limit your air travel to once per year and the reason to eliminate it 
altogether.57 The Third Limit also has the plausible implication that it is not overall 
praiseworthy to press the button in the variant of the bank robbery example, regardless of how 
costly it is to you to do so. The difference between the reason to press the button and the reason 
to do the alternative there is least reason to do is zero, since pressing the button just is the 
alternative there is least reason to do. Zero cannot be sufficiently great relative to the difference 
between the reason to press the button and the reason to do the alternative there is most reason 
to do (do nothing).  
                                                          
57 This seems plausible even if the fact that an act is impermissible itself provides a reason against doing it. For 
discussion, see: Stephen Darwall, “But It Would Be Wrong,” Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2010): 135–57.  
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It is not my aim here to defend the Third Limit.58 But if it is correct, it will constrain the 
general form that cases of the sort picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy can take. 
Namely they will have to take something close to the general form of three-alternative cases 
like those offered above in sections II and III. Here is proof. Assume for reductio that A and B 
are the only two alternatives, that A is impermissible, that B is permissible, and that A is overall 
praiseworthy. For A to be impermissible, it must be that there is most requiring reason to do B, 
and insufficient justification to do A. Then, according to the Third Limit, A is overall 
praiseworthy only if the difference between the reason to do A and the reason to do the 
alternative there is least reason to do (A) is sufficiently great relative to the difference between 
the reason to do A and the reason to do the alternative there is most reason to do (B). Since a 
difference of zero cannot be sufficient (relative to the difference between the reason to do A 
and the reason to do B), A is not overall praiseworthy. But this contradicts the assumption that 
                                                          
58 In addition to noting that the Third Limit has plausible implications in the air travel and bank robbery examples, 
we might think it can be supported by the following rationale: The fact that A responds to a reason—for example, 
to help the homeless person—will not always be enough to render A overall praiseworthy, regardless of how 
costly it is for you to do A. It will not be enough when A unjustifiably falls short of what there is most requiring 
reason to do, as then A will be more blameworthy, the costlier or more difficult it is for you to do A than it is to 
do what you have most requiring reason to do (see, for instance, Nelkin 2016 (368–69)). If scaling up the cost of 
A so amplifies A’s blameworthiness, then scaling up the cost of A will need to simultaneously amplify its 
praiseworthiness to a relevantly greater extent, for A to be overall praiseworthy. But as A’s cost-amplified 
blameworthiness is based upon a difference between the reason to do A and the reason to do the alternative there 
is most reason to do, it is plausible that the cost-amplified praiseworthiness needed to counterbalance this would 
similarly be based upon a difference in reason (mass noun)—namely between the reason to do A and the reason 
to do the alternative there is least reason to do. Different precisifications of the Third Limit can take different 
views as to how far above what there is least reason to do A needs to rise, for a given shortfall between A and what 
there is most reason to do. Which precisification is correct may depend on the respective rates at which A’s 
praiseworthiness increases and A’s blameworthiness increases, as the cost to you of doing A is scaled up. 
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A is overall praiseworthy. So, we have a case in which impermissible act A is overall 
praiseworthy, and more so than permissible alternative B, only when A is made impermissible 
by the presence of a third alternative C—that is, when there is more requiring reason to do C 
than there is to do A and insufficient justification to do A rather than C. According to the Third 
Limit, then, A will be overall praiseworthy only if there is more reason to do A than there is to 
do B (assuming B is the only alternative to A besides C). And for B to remain permissible, there 
will in turn have to be sufficient justification to do B. Thus, if the Third Limit holds, cases of 
the sort picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy will have something close to the general 
form of three-alternative cases like those offered above in sections II and III (imagine A is 
“save the lesser number,” B is “do nothing,” and C is “save the greater number”). 
Even if cases of the sort picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy all share the 
same general form, it is important to observe that they need not all share the same content. 
Section III looks at cases of innumerate altruism, in which you can do nothing, rescue the few 
at great cost to yourself, or rescue the many at the same cost to yourself. To my mind, these are 
among the most compelling cases of the sort picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy 
(especially Red/Green No-Conflict and Red/Green Conflict).59 But perhaps others will find 
other cases more compelling still, such as variants of the vegetarianism or air travel examples 
in which it is very costly to you to respond to the relevant reasons. Or take an example involving 
promise-keeping: Suppose you have made eleven promises to your business associates. You 
have a strong requiring reason to keep ten of them, and a significant but relatively weak 
requiring reason to keep the eleventh. In virtue of some great unexpected cost to you of keeping 
                                                          
59 In cases like Red/Green No-Conflict and Red/Green Conflict, not only is it plausible that saving the lesser 
number (impermissible) is more praiseworthy overall than doing nothing (permissible), but it might also be 
plausible that saving the lesser number (impermissible) is nearly as praiseworthy overall as saving the greater 
number (permissible). 
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these promises, there is sufficient justification not to keep any of them.60 Now suppose you can 
do nothing, incur this great cost to keep ten of the promises, or incur this same great cost to 
keep all eleven. It may well be impermissible yet overall praiseworthy to incur the cost to keep 
just the ten promises (and more so than doing nothing).61 
 
V. Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy in Practice 
While it does seem to me that some of the cases of innumerate altruism explored in section III 
plausibly are of the form picked out by Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy, it is not my primary 
aim to show this. Instead my main aim has been to defend the plausibility of the claim that 
there exist some cases of this general form, whether or not they are the particular ones I discuss. 
But the particular cases I have discussed, together with the general framework presented in 
section II—and supplemented with one or more of the limits of praiseworthiness from section 
IV—should give readers a good sense of how to construct many additional cases that fit the 
relevant form. I will now conclude with a brief discussion of some potential practical 
implications. 
                                                          
60 Suppose the requiring reason to keep these promises is not defeated by the unexpected cost of keeping them. 
61 Arguably you can also go beyond the call of duty in ways worthy of praise without making any significant 
sacrifice, as when you do a small kindness or forgive a wrongdoer. But while it could be impermissible to keep 
fewer promises rather than keep more at no greater cost, it is somewhat hard to see how it could be impermissible 
to do fewer small kindnesses rather than do more at no greater cost, or to forgive fewer wrongdoers rather than 
forgive more at no greater cost. This is because while there is significant requiring reason to keep promises, and 
plausibly significantly more requiring reason to keep more promises than there is to keep fewer, it is far from clear 
whether there is any significant requiring reason to do small kindnesses or to forgive (or more requiring reason to 
do more such things). Doing small kindnesses and forgiving are often taken to be paradigm examples of acts there 
is merely non-requiring reason to do. See footnote 27. 
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I have here focused on somewhat idealized examples in an effort to provide a clear and 
minimally noisy case for Impermissible Yet Praiseworthy. There is good reason to believe there 
are also plenty of real-world cases that are of the sort picked out by Impermissible Yet 
Praiseworthy. Arguably many can be found in the growing literature on “effective altruism.”62 
For instance, that literature suggests there are many cases in which the same monetary donation 
can save at least twice as many lives (if not ten or even a hundred times as many) if given to 
one charity rather than another. In a sizable subset of those cases, we have no special or 
personal connection to either charity, or at least no greater such connection to one than the 
other, and yet because we have already given an awful lot in the past, because we are choosing 
between such a large donation to one charity and an equally large donation to the other, or 
because morality turns out to be quite undemanding, we are not required to make the donation 
in question. Although ineffective charitable giving is often attributable to ignorance of relevant 
cost-effectiveness differences, it is also often attributable to a degree of (moderately) 
innumerate altruism on our part. Such cases of ineffective giving may be relevantly analogous 
to Costly Conflict, in that there is sufficient cost-based justification for doing nothing, and yet 
saving the lives of n strangers at cost C is impermissible given that we can instead save the 
lives of at least 2n different strangers at cost C.63 Although I have here focused on saving more 
or fewer lives, numerate altruism is not only about appropriate responsiveness to the number 
                                                          
62 For example, see: Toby Ord, “The Moral Imperative towards Cost-Effectiveness in Global Health,” Centre for 
Global Development (2013): www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1427016; William MacAskill, Doing 
Good Better: Effective Altruism and a Radical New Way to Make a Difference (London: Faber & Faber, 2015); 
Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, edited by Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2019). 
63 As suggested earlier (in footnote 54), perhaps when the ratio difference between non-overlapping groups is 
fairly small it is permissible to save the smaller group instead of saving the larger group (for example, saving 11 
strangers rather than 12 different strangers, or 99 rather than 100).  
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of individuals we can help, but also the degree to which we can help individuals and the 
probability our acts will actually help them. And giving to charity is but one relevant sort of 
real-world case—others may include volunteering, choosing a career, or fighting humanitarian 
wars.64 To be sure, there are many significant disanalogies between these real-world cases and 
idealized ones like Costly Conflict.65 Here is not the place to argue that these potential 
disanalogies do not make inapt the intended analogy. 
 To the extent that such an analogy holds, there are many real-world cases of 
impermissible altruism that is more praiseworthy overall than permissible and blameless non-
altruism. When we find ourselves engaged in such impermissible altruism, we should not focus 
entirely on our conduct’s negative aspect, and not only because of the counterproductivity of 
doing so. Our conduct is not only overall praiseworthy, but (considerably) more so than the 
permissible non-altruism of many others. At the same time, we should not lose sight of the fact 
that our conduct is impermissible, and has a blameworthy aspect. The ideally appropriate 
response to such impermissible altruism is mixed, a proportionate reflection of both the 
praiseworthy as well as blameworthy aspects of our conduct. When such an ideal response is 
impossible, or psychologically infeasible, we may have to navigate between under-blaming 
ourselves and under-praising ourselves. When it comes to our responses to the impermissible 
yet praiseworthy altruism of others, these matters are arguably more delicate still.66 
                                                          
64 On this last sort of case, see: Victor Tadros, “Unjust Wars Worth Fighting For,” Journal of Practical Ethics 4 
(2016): 52–80; Kieran Oberman, “War and Poverty,” Philosophical Studies 176 (2019): 197–217. 
65 See, for instance: Sinclair 2018; Woollard 2015; Kamm 2007; Caspar Hare, “Obligations to Merely Statistical 
People,” The Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012): 378–390; Andreas Mogensen, “The Callousness Objection,” in 
Greaves and Pummer 2019, 227–240. 
66 See [redacted] on asymmetries between self-blame and other-blame.  
